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Acquisition of major weapons systems has become a progressively more
complicated process. This is due, in part, to the complexity of modern warfare.
Integrated (interoperable) command and control (C") systems are required to
effectively harness and employ the destructive nature of military' forces. Integration
demands measures to overcome technical intricacies and efforts to master the political
and cultural pressures highlighted in the following quote [Ref. 1: p. ii].
GETTING INTERSERVICE AGREEMENT IS THE MOST DIFFICULT
PHASE: Service diflerences in doctrines, operations, logistics, and procedures
tend to diversify svstem designs. When joint acquisitions are ordered bv the
Secretary of Defense or the Congress, the biggest hurdle is getting the services to
agree oh joint requirements. Each service "Believes that its concept of a new
aircraft, missile, or vehicle will be best for the mission and will oppose
compromise of its design or performance goals. Agreement is still more elusive
when one or another svstem is already well into development with a "hardened''
design, decisions firmed, costs sunk, and a dedicated constituency in place. This
is when many program mergers are ordered.
The Department of Defense has outlined procedures directed at resolving integration
(interoperability) issues. At the heart of this enterprise is a requirement to outline a
joint Command, Control and Communications (C ) architecture and to build a joint
interoperability database [Ref. 2: p. 4-5]. The multifarious nature of this endeavor
makes it necessary to collect tools to describe, in structured terms, the process of
command and the communications necessary to control diverse elements.
B. SCOPE
This thesis will focus on four tools that can be used by acquisition managers to
consolidate and refine the measures and specifications necessary to affect a systematic
approach to procurement. Specifically, these devices can assist supervisors in refining
mission needs and stipulating the requirements necessary to meet these demands. The
Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) will provide the
framework for evaluating C architectures. Generic system attributes need to be
defined and assigned numeric values, where possible and practical, to be analyzed.
This thesis will define, in the author's words, essential communications considerations
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used by Marine Corps communications managers. Marine Corps Technical Interface
Concepts (TIC) are applied to describe the boundaries and process definitions,
integrate these descriptions, and then provide data for specified measures. Finally,
System Effectiveness Analysis (SEA) outlines a quantitative approach to aggregate and
evaluate recommended measures.
C. THESIS OUTLINE
This thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter II describes the framework
of VICES, in acquisition related terms. Chapter III defines communications attributes.
While not an all-encompassing list, it provides generic considerations to be used to
specify Measures of Performance or Effectiveness. Chapter IV outlines the Marine
Corps Technical Interface Concepts followed by an explanation of System
Effectiveness Analysis (Chapter V). Chapter VI then applies the previously described
tools to a C J system. Chapter VII summarizes the results and recommends areas for
further research. Appendix A provides a dictionary of acronyms and terms used to
describe this process. The sources for these definitions include JCS Publication 1,
"DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," January 1986, and the references
cited throughout the text. This thesis assumes a basic knowledge of communications
engineering principles and of the acquisition process. Appendix B provides an
overview of the acquisitions process. Inasmuch as regulations are constantly changing,
Appendix B is somewhat dated; however, the principles and structure remain essentially
unchanged.
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II. MODULAR COMMAND AND CONTROL EVALUATION
STRUCTURE (MCES) METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) is a
framework for systems planners and evaluators to assess C architectures. By
extension, it is a useful basis for analyzing the communications processes necessary to
support command and facilitate control. Its functional applications may extend
beyond the bounds of C J studies. This thesis will concentrate on defining its utility as
an acquisitions guide to evaluate, inter alia, communications interoperability.
B. BACKGROUND
The development of MCES was initially triggered by a challenge to Air Force
planners to determine the force effectiveness of C systems. This implied a search for a
means of analyzing these systems throughout their life-cycle. Expert knowledge of the
analytic community was focused through a conference chaired by Dr. Ricki Sweet and
LtCol Thomas Fagan III. USAF. Five working groups were formed to address:
Definitions, Conceptual Models, the Identification of Measures of Effectiveness
(MOEs). Evaluation Techniques and Approaches and an overall appraisal of the
current status and future course of MOE analysis.
Based on an expressed interest and need for further attention to C^ systems'
contribution to force effectiveness, an effectiveness "strawman" was developed by Drs.
Mort Metersky, Michael G. Sovereign, and Ricki Sweet to provide a framework for
subsequent deliberations at the MORS (Military Operations Research Society)
sponsored workshop. An integrated document describing VICES was published in June
1986 [Ref. 3: pp. 19-21]. MCES has been tested and refined through service
community input [Ref. 4] and through the voluntary contribution of government,
military and civilian agencies, and companies [Ref. 3: p. 24].
This chapter provides an explanation of MCES presented, where appropriate,
with reference to DoD acquisition requirements. It is a restatement, in the author's
































Figure 2.1 The Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure.
C. METHODOLOGY
The MCES (Figure 2.1) consists of two components: (1) managerial and (2)
analytical systems. The former guides the user through specification while the latter
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outlines analysis processes (both objective and subjective). The MCES is intended to
guide problem specification and analysis in order to provide a manager with concise
conclusions thereby enhancing decision making. This direction is accomplished
through use of seven modules using pragmatic, established techniques.
1. Module 1: Problem Formulation
Module 1 describes the decision maker's objectives. These objectives should
fill a mission need and demonstrate a level of performance and reliability that justify
the allocation of the Nation's limited resources for the system's ownership and or
acquisition [Ref. 5: p. 4]. Implementation of this module results in a more precise
statement of the problem to be addressed. Problem formulation should consider
elements of not only mission assignment but also the intelligence or threat assessment
and scenario(s) underlying the analysis.
2. Module 2: C~ System Bounding
The problem statement developed in Module 1 is then used to bound the C
system of interest. This module has been perhaps one of the most overlooked elements
in preparation of acquisition strategies and Justification for Major System New Starts
(JMSNS). Bounding the project allows managers and engineers to focus their efforts
rather than attempt description of a panacea for all existing deficiencies. Module 2
specifies the first two of the three dimensions which define a C system, namely:
• physical entities (equipment, software, people and facilities);
• structure (organization, concepts of operation and information flow patterns);
and,
• process (the functionality or "what the system is doing").
Bounding in this module occurs when the project team defines who or what entities
have a requirement to interact (process - the final C dimension developed further in
the next module) in what manner or along what lines (structure).
3. Module 3: C~ Process Definition
Understanding the system bounds allows a focused description of Command
and Control processes (Module 3). Other generic models such as Boyd's O-O-D-A and
Lawson's control loop are applied to force attention on:
• the environmental "initiator" of the C^ process;
the internal processes that characterize what the svstem is doing (ex. sense,
assess, generate, select, plan, and direct) (see Figure 2.2); and; or,






















Figure 2.2 Generic Command and Control Process.
4. Module 4: Integration of System Elements and Functions
The fourth module verbally or graphically depicts the three dimensional
system. It maps entities with their required processes, forming the structure necessary
to answer the mission objective of Module 1. Techniques such as Data Flow Diagrams
(DFDs) are frequently used to show the information (low through the model.
Hierarchical relationships are drawn as data progresses through the system to a
decision maker or into master databases for further or future processing.
5. Module 5: Specification of Measures (Criteria)
The definitive processes of the preceding modules lead logically to the
specification of measures necessary to address the problem of interest. These measures
are classified as to their level of measurement.
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a. Measures of Performance (MOPs)
Measures of Performance are specified inside the boundary of the O
system [Ref. 4: p. 17], that is. they measure performance of the system processes. A set
of generic Communications MOPs will be presented in Chapter III. An example of a
communications performance measure would be a specific bit error rate (BER)
requirement for a data transmission system.
b. Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are specified outside the boundary of
the communications system [Ref. 4: p. 17]. MOEs are C process measures placed on
the system being evaluated in the context of the system's effect on the larger (Force)
process. They describe a force action or lack thereof impacted or directed by the
system. As an example, in order to ENGAGE an enemy (Force level) you first have to
FIND or LOCATE (system level) him.
c. Measures of Force Effectiveness (MOFEs)
Measures of Force Effectiveness (MOFEs), then, describe the force effect
on its environment. These combine all of the system's performance and effectiveness
measures and could describe such things as battle outcome or target destruction.
Figure 2.3 portrays the aforementioned relationships.
The specified measures are subjected to further scrutiny by comparing them
to a set of criteria (Table 1) reducing the number to a more manageable set. The final
list is taken to be critical or the minimum necessary to measure the problem at hand.
6. Module 6: Data Generation
Module 6 addresses the requirement to generate data relative to the Measures
specified in Module 5. Data can be generated through any number of means (i.e.,
exercises, experiments, simulations, or subjective judgement). In the acquisition
process, values are generated for specified measures relative to the force and
environment (MOE MOFEs) and then to system entities (MOPs). This would imply a
top-down design approach. It also implies an iterative process wherein specification
dependencies are highlighted, analyzed and resolved. Chapters IV and V will describe a
means of acquiring data to describe the generic communications MOPs outlined in
Chapter III.
7. Module 7: Aggregation of Measures
The final module addresses aggregation or analysis of the previously defined
system. As support for a JMSNS, analysis may determine the essential features of a
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new system's effect on the force compared with programs already in existence (DoD
Milestone 0). Following a decision to acquire (DoD Milestone 1), investigation is
conducted into alternative means in order to refine requests for proposals (RFPs) and
generate a specific statement of work (SOW). Finally, the system measures are
compared with proposals and products through the full scale development phase and
used to determine contractor qualification for contract.
Existing systems are evaluated as changes to mission statements and objectives
are directed to demonstrate or validate their utility in the force as a whole.
D. DECISION MAKER
The products provided by the MCES modules are presented to a decision maker.
Three general courses of action are then available. The results may be implemented
based on the analysis. Alternatively, a need for further study, refining any or all of the
Modules, may be directed. Finally, a decisionmaker may terminate the process.
VICES does not define a specific decision process. This is left to the manager to
describe. The process may be entirely subjective based on the evaluator's personal
assessment of the data generated. It may be very objective, based solely on numbers
generated combined with weighted measures. Or it could encompass any combination
of these processes. As a generic tool, MCES specifies only the logical framework or





'design parameters ENVIRONMENT CONTEXT(SCENARIO)
MOP - Measure of Performance
MOE - Measure of Effectiveness
MOFE - Measure of Force Effectiveness
MOPE - Measure of Policy Effectiveness
MEO - Message Exchange Occurence
(See Chapter IV)
NCA • National Command Authority





Mission Oriented Relates to force/system mission
Discriminatory Identifies real difference between
alternatives
Measurable Can be computed or estimated
Quantitative Can be assigned numbers or ranked
Realistic Relates realistically to the C2 system
and associated uncertainties
Objective Can be defined or derived, independent
of subjective opinion. (It is recognized
that some measures cannot be
objectively defined).
Appropriate Relates to acceptable standards and
analysis objectives
Sensitive Reflects changes in system variables
Inclusive Reflects those standards required
by the analysis objectives
Independent Is mutually exclusive with respect
to other measures




The MCES. described in Chapter II, directed specification of measures as the
requirement for Module 5 of the Structure. This chapter will describe the efforts of
JTC A in their research on specifying measures [Ref. 6] and then outline generic
communication system measures, recommended by this author, to be considered as a
guide in acquisition planning. The Technical Report referenced in the introduction and
its accompanying appendix [Ref. 7] present the preliminary JTC A results on
assessment and evaluation techniques for joint tactical command, control and
communications systems, networks, links and facilities. The JTC A work has
attempted definition of MOE's for five major C" elements (see Table 2). In keeping
with the thesis scope, the controlling factors outlined will refer to the communications
element of the C architecture.
B. BACKGROUND
Analysts define and use MOEs in the development of system and sub-system
architectures. Commencing with work conducted by the Joint Tactical
Communications Office (TRI-TAC) in the 1970-80 time period in which seventeen
measures were published, to date about two hundred MOEs have been identified and
defined by JTC JA [Ref. 6: p. 4]. Some of these are hardware oriented and therefore
technical in scope such as "ECCM LPI", "Antenna Gain", and "Transmission Power."
Others are non-technical requirements relating to such functions as "Monitoring",
"Capability to Select Options, Employ Forces, and Execute Operations" and
"Responsiveness to Warning and Threat Assessments." Certain measures address total
system orientation such as "Maintainability", "Survivability", and "Mobility." JTC A
emphasizes that "...these MOEs are structured for preliminary design comparison." In
the MCES framework, they are also useful when applied and evaluated in an iterative
fashion as tools to define the system or sub-system bounds. In other words
specification of the measures themselves may help refine initial bounding when
performance or effectiveness standards (MOPs MOEs) fail to meet or answer problem
objectives. This occurs as the decision maker is presented with architectural
alternatives which address a stated mission need (determined in Module 1).
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C. MOE ORGANIZATION AND FORMAT
The JTC JA listing of MOEs is organized into five groups as shown in Table 2
These correspond to the five major C elements mentioned in OJCS SM-7-82
[Ref. 6: p. 5]. They are divided further into sub-elements, also illustrated in Table 2.
Communications is visualized as the bonding agent of C systems and is categorized in
terms of "transmission" and "connectivity/distribution." Keeping with the scope of this
work, this author will describe the Communications category and specific generic
measures to be considered when describing or defining a system. This is contrary to
the global JTC JA approach wherein measures are specified by communications media
type.
Reference 7 uses the format presented in Table 3 to present specific measures.
Inasmuch as this represents a goal which JTC°A has yet to realize, the title and
definition of each measure will be used in this thesis. Comments regarding evaluation
will be presented in a discussion section. Sources and data requirements will be
omitted for the generic measures. The "MOP or MOD Title" line refers to the
Measures of Performance (MOP) previously discussed and Measures of Design (MOD)
representing field operational characteristics (ex., "Transportability" and
"Maintainability"). The reference admits no great significance in the distinction
[Ref. 6: p. 6]. In order to prevent confusion and follow the MCES outline, only
"MOPs" will be listed in the title lines for this work.
D. GENERIC MEASURES
1. Introduction
This section presents generic measures of performance to be applied to
communications systems analysis in the MCES framework. The measures listed are in
no particular order of importance. While perhaps lacking in depth of description and
breadth of attribute (measure) coverage, it should provide the reader a skeleton on
which to build a more comprehensive listing. It is understood that many of these
measures are interrelated. Parameters or characteristics of one may impact or affect
another. Some of these relations are highlighted. Others may have been omitted. It
remains a requirement for the analysis team using these measures to describe
interdependencies as complementary or disparate and develop the decision tools to
compromise or obviate differences. JTC A also emphasized that their measures are
proposed for communications systems only. This also applies herein. The measures
22
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discussed stem from system attributes defined for Marine communications managers.
It is felt that attributes of an efficient effective communications system should relate to
measures used in evaluating proposed and existing systems.
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TABLE 3
FORMAT FOR EACH MOE
MOP or MOD TITLE:
DEFINITION: or description of what the title measures
METHODOLOGY: either qualitative or quantitative for preparing
the measure, Including Important parameters, factors,
models and considerations
SOURCES: that are useful for further research
DATA REQUIREMENTS: for using the algorithms and models
2. Reliability
a. Definition
Measures (the) probability that an item will perform its intended function
for a specified interval under stated conditions [Ref. 7: p. A- 14].
b. Discussion
Reliability is usually expressed in terms of Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF). Coupled with maintainability, it impacts availability of the communications
system. MTBF is usually measured in hours. Military standards exist to describe
component specifications and, by extension, can be used to describe system
requirements.
Reliability may imply redundance which measures duplication of
components. A high reliability requirement coupled with low MTBF will normally
require redundancy which will usually impact system life cycle cost (both initial
procurement and supportability).
Component reliability measures may depend on element placement in the
C system. Higher priority elements will normally require higher restoral ability,
impacting the value assigned to reliability.
Link reliability expresses an assurance that communications will function
accurately [Ref. 8: p. 2-4]. In this sense transmission efficiency, receiver sensitivity, and
receiver selectivity are considered quantitative measures.
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c. Conclusion
The following elements can be used in defining a reliability measure:
• Overall Reliability Requirement (Measured in percentages)
• Component MTBF (in hours)
• Redundancy (No. of backup components required)
• Receive Sensitivity (ability to detect signals)
• Receive Selectivity (ability to differentiate signals)
• Transmission Efficiency (includes SNR/Error Detection Techniques)
• Required Bit-Error-Rate (BER)
• Mean Time to Repair (MTTR)
3. Interoperability
a. Definition
The condition achieved among communications electronics systems or
items of communications electronics equipment when information or services can be
exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and or their users. The degree of
interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases.
The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept
services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to
enable them to operate effectively together. (JCS Pub 1)
b. Discussion
Communications interoperability, while seemingly simple to define, has
been characteristically difficult to attain. Interoperability is a function of:
Equipment compatibility;
Interface operating procedures; and,
Message formatting and design standards.
Interoperability may be measured with respect to any or all of these functions.
Technical Interface Standards consist of specifications of the functional, electrical, and
physical characteristics necessary to allow the exchange of information across an
interface between different tactical C~\ systems or equipment [Ref. 2: p. 2-1].
Procedural standards consist of specifications for the manner of accomplishing the
exchange of information across an interface. They define:
The form or format in which information is to be exchanged;
the prescribed information exchange language, syntax, and vocabularv to be
used in the information exchange; and,
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interface operating procedures that govern the information exchange [Ref. 2: p.
(1) Compatibility. Elements or parameters to be considered when ensuring
communications compatibility include modulation, frequency range, range, signalling,
cryptographic hardware and software, and interface connectivity. Of the
aforementioned parameters, interface connectivity is, at times, the most difficult
element of compatibility element to achieve. Intra and interservice Command and
Control Elements (C~E's) use a wide variety of computer and radio control
equipments. In designing a system, existing terminal devices must be considered for
numerous reasons, not the least of which is cost. DoD has a stated policy to minimize
the number of buffering, translative, or similar devices to achieve interoperability
[Ref. 9: p. 2]. A judicious use of modems, buffers and translaters must routinely be
designed into communications architectures to ensure interoperability.
(2) Message Formatting and Design. Message formating and design
features are specified in the JCS, JINTACCS (Joint Interoperability of Tactical
Command and Control Systems) program as well as in Technical Interface Design
Plans (TIDPs) (Addressed in Chapter IV). Elements are combined, in an approved
sequence, to form a standard message. Once it is determined that input messages to a
transmitting device match output messages in a receiver, compatibility is said to exist.
Where discontinuities exist, measures are taken to resolve differences. For example, if
operationally required formats do not exist in the JINTACCS system, then justification
is drawn to include the message as a new standard. Once this justification is accepted,
new message formats are derived. A process wherein this is accomplished is described
in Chapter IV, Technical Interface Concepts.
(3) Interface Operating Procedures. Interface operating procedures, while
ultimately linked to the format and design features already addressed, are developed as
a result of Combined and Joint Service training and exercises. These require agreement
on the part of all agencies as to. ultimately, the method(s) by which elements,
commands, and forces are directed or controlled in a tactical environment. There are
several stumbling blocks to acquisition planners as well as operational commanders.
First, achieving a unified view is particularly difficult given unit and service
parochialism. Next, qualifying or quantifying this requirement requires extensive
operational tests and; or simulation. Finally, tradeoffs that are made during the
acquisition process may impact reliability, speed, flexibility, economic factors, or even
the entire project success.
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c. Conclusion
The following elements can be used in quantifying an interoperability
measure:
• Overall Communications Interoperability Requirement
Percentages)
Measured in
Modulation - The extent to which both equipments are capable of
operating using the same modulation scheme
Frequency Range - The extent to which equipments have the same (or
nearly the samel frequency ranee and tuning capability to accommodate
assigned frequencies (applicable for RF systems)
Ranee - distance or coverage of the system affected bv transmit power,
antenna gain, receive sensitivity, repeaters, propagation and terrain
Signalling - The nature of such types as analog or digital, in-band or out-
ofrband;"etc.
Cryptographic - The extent to which hardware is compatible with the radio
or wire system. Software must be approved for, be compatible with, and be
available'to all desired users.
Interface Connectivity - The extent to which the communications system
supports each element specified in theproblem definition (Module 1 -
MCES) and bounded (in Module 2 - MCES).
Message Format and Design - The extent to which required messages meet
existing criteria or that additional standards must be created.
Interface Operating Procedures - again, in answering the Module 1
requirements and Module 2 bounds, tlfe extent to which all elements are in
agreement as to direction and control.
4. Speed
a. Definition
Speed denotes timeliness in the flow of information between users of
communications [Ref. S: p. 2-5]. Speed is a communication element measure of
performance supporting the timeliness measure of effectiveness of the C system.
b. Discussion
A quantitative measure of speed is based on operational urgency. Speed is
usually defined for digital systems in terms of bits-per-second (BPS) or baud rate. It is
dependent on the communications means chosen and the efficiency of technology and
design. Speed is also controlled by procedures. Personnel training and adherence to
precedence as well as other message designators may impact communications speed.
In addition to BPS and Baud rate, speed may be determined by: throughput, switching
rate, routing plan, human message handling speeds, dialing method, precedence levels,
processor speed and capacity; and, queueing [Ref. 7: p. A-26J.
27
Grade-of-Service (GOS) for switched (circuit, message, and packet) systems,
indicating a probability of a call (message) being blocked or delayed more than a
specified interval, could also be used as a measure of speed. GOS varies from
subjective ratings such as excellent, good, fair, poor or unsatisfactory, to quantitative
probability calculations based on the following generalized equation [Ref. 7: p. A-24].
GOS = f(T.C.R,A.D) where:
1 = traffic volume bv type of service (in erlanes)
C = channel capacity
R = alternate routing capability
A = call or message arrival probability distribution (assumed to
be poisson distributed for commercial communications)
D = channel degradation
c. Conclusion
The following elements may be used in supporting speed as a measure of
performance:
• Overall Required Speed (measured in time)




Human message handling speeds
Dialing method (touch-tone, rotary or operator assist)
Precedence levels





Security is the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny
unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from the possession
and study of communications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their
interpretation of such a study [Ref. 8: p.2-4].
b. Discussion
The four elements of communications security (COMSEC) are: crypto
security, transmission security, emission security and physical security.
Crypto security results from the provision of technically sound
cryptosystems and their proper use [Ref. 8: p. 6-19]. In acquisition of communications
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systems this involves working closely with the National Security Agency (NSA), the
certifying authority for new systems applications. Crypto security measures may
impact interoperability. As an example, a crypto system in use on one type of HF
radio may not be approved for use with a new design. While all of the other
compatibility measures may match, a requirement for a new crypto system seriously
impairs interoperability, perhaps rendering the new design unsuitable. The requirement
for crypto security may also degrade flexibility. Cryptographic material, both hardware
and software, is issued with the realization that only loss of the software will
compromise the system and then only for the period the software is in effect.
Consideration must be given to the area in which the equipment will be employed. Use
in a hazardous region may require limited distribution or minimal holding of the
material impacting system flexibility. Alternatively, a system applying a remote keying
scheme may be more costly and require more training to operate, affecting simplicity
and economy.
Transmission security results from all measures designed to protect
transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than crypto analysis
[Ref. 8: p. 6-22], commonly referred to as LPE, LPI (Low Probability
Exploitation Intercept). Limited exploitation relates to the cryptographic capability to
mask the information content of the transmission. This is often measured by the
amount of time necessary to decipher the text without a key. The limited probability
of intercept measures the range within which an enemy must be in order to detect and
intercept a signal. This implies knowledge of the enemies capabilities and intentions
and or predicted future abilities which should have been considered in the Problem
Formulation and System Bounding stages of the MCES. In determining the
probability of intercept or effect on a communications system, planners will use such
parameters as; range (from enemy jammer, receiver), transmit power (jammer and. or
friendly transmitter), type of signalling and modulation, receiver allowed bit-error-rate
(BER), antenna design, and propagation factors (including terrain).
Emission security refers to that component of COMSEC resulting from
measures taken to deny information of value that may be derived from intercept and
analysis of emanations from crypto equipment and telecommunications systems
[Ref. 8: p. 6-26]. Care must be taken in systems design to reduce unintended
emanations from tactical equipments. Such signals may appear as electromagnetic
radiation from constant key sources, conducted emanations, powerline modulation, or
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acoustic emanations. All are susceptible to interception and exploitation either to
disclose classified information, to allow direction finding of transmitter sites, or to
permit identification of electronic order of battle fingerprints of headquarters elements.
Adherence, by both designer and operator, to TEMPEST requirements, established by
\SA, should effectively reduce the unintended emanations. Simulation and operational
testing of a proposed system coincident with existing systems should aid designers and
operators in identifying and overcoming architectural weaknesses relative to emission
security.
Physical security refers to the component of COVISEC resulting from all
physical measures taken to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents
from access to or observation by unauthorized persons [Ref. 8: p. 6-27]. Physical
security, like crypto security, impacts the design process relative to flexibility and
economy. The requirement to safeguard systems and software may impact universal
usage and/or drive acquisition costs past on acceptable level.
c. Conclusion
The following parameters may be used in describing security as a measure
of performance:
• Overall Security Requirement
Economic (Cost) constraint
Crypto (hardware/software compatibility) requirement
Required probability of intercept/exploitation




Adaptable to change (Random House Dictionary). The ability to support
a wide dispersion of units under adverse or varying conditions [Ref. 8: p. 2-5].
b. Discussion
The Marine Corps definition is limited in that it implies a universal use and
is directed more towards the planning and integration of all systems to support
command and control. It requires acquisition sponsors to consider the combined
effects of proposed and existing systems and to study the results of operational tests
before committing to full-scale production.
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Because of the versatile nature of modern warfare, flexibility also infers
mobility, or the ability to retain command and control while on the move. This
influences size, weight and transportability of equipment, personnel and logistics to
support the system.
The dictionary definition indicates an ability to change by expanding,
contracting or reorganizing the service provided. It may also allow change of modes
within a specified range of operation. For instance; an error control may be relaxed for
digitized voice and increased for data transmission. Or, in order to improve emission
security, transmission power may be tunable to the least amount necessary to ensure
reception limiting the range of interception.
c. Conclusion
Flexibility determinants include:
Ability to expand, contract, or reorganize service
Choices of bit rate
Choice of transmitter power




All measures taken to prevent disruption of communications by 1 ) enemy
interference or natural disaster [Ref. 8: p. 2-7] and, 2) measures the capability to
survive conventional, nuclear and CBR attack for continuity of operation under the
worst probable conditions of conflict [Ref. 7: p. A-8].
b. Discussion
As a function of the sum of the aforementioned factors, the survivability
measure must be evaluated as constrained by budgetary considerations.
Disruption by enemy interference has been covered, albeit obliquely, under
transmission security. The same parameters, ie., range, transmit power, type of
signalling and modulation, BER, antenna design, and propagation factors, are used to
determine the effect of communication jammers. The use of similar design parameters
do not adversely affect measure independence. The equations used to derive the
measures are unique.
Measures to prevent natural and or man-made disaster include such
elements as redundancy (outlined under Reliability) and design. Design criteria
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describe the physical characteristics of equipment necessary to withstand chemical,
nuclear and conventional damaging effects. Such requirements inherently drive-up
costs as physical properties are reinforced and electronic components are built or
backed-up to withstand the affects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP).




• Overall Survivability Requirement
• Economic (cost) constraint
• Redundancy (Number of backups required)
• Range
• Transmit power
• Signalling and modulation
• BER
• Antenna design




The ease of access and operation for users, and the ease of installation,
operation and maintenance for operators [Ref. 8: p. 2-7].
b. Discussion
Simplicity, easy to define, is becoming characteristically ignored in new
systems development. The technology that allows a reduction in operations manning,
at times, increases the demand on communications managers and personnel. Thus,
from both budgetary (in terms of manpower) and simplicity perspectives, trade-offs
must be made in order to find the optimum mix between operations and
communications.
Simplicity may also affect flexibility. A flexible system, one with many




• Simplicity requirement; balanced against,
• Budgetary (Manpower training) impact
• Flexibility and mission need statements
9. Economy
a. Definition
Economy results from actions taken to ensure the best use of available
communications personnel, equipment and supplies etc.(Random House Dictionary).
b. Discussion
While previously mentioned as a constraining parameter for other
measures, economy, or a degree of economy, should be considered as a measure itself.
Given a cost constraint, the acquisition manager must balance the bounded mission
need against the cost of acquiring the measures necessary to support the requirement.
Hence, the budget is compared with the sum of the costs of supporting each measure.
Simply put. if cost exceeds budget, the manager must justify a request for increased
funds, reiterate the MCES process, or recommend project cancellation or re-definition.
c. Conclusion
Economy requires conciliation between the project and existing demands
for scarce resources (money, personnel and equipment). Given a budgetary or cost
restriction, the decision maker must make even' effort to stay within these guidelines
while ensuring, first and foremost, that the mission requirement (Module 1) is resolved.
E. MEASURE INTERACTION
The introduction to the previous section alluded to potential interrelationships
between measures. Figure 3.1 graphically portrays these associations. The
dependencies or connections are represented by the lines drawn between the measures.
Arrows indicate flow. While it may certainly be debated that all measures are related,
one to another, the links shown depict the author's subjective judgement of the most
important effects. Other analytical means, beyond the scope of this thesis, are needed
to determine degrees of interaction. Sensitivity analysis or a database of past
experience are two possible ways to define measure interplay.
F. CONSIDERATIONS
Numeric values approaching 100% are desired for some of these measures
(reliability, interoperability, security, flexibility and survivability). While verbal merits
such as "fastest" (speed), "least expensive" (economy), and "uncomplicated" (simplicity)








Tigure 3.1 Measures Interactions.
unattainable. When specifying these measures, consideration must be given to their
underlying parameters and overall system requirements. For example, while it may be
nice to have a system that will operate at 5 megabits-per-second, to cover every
eventuality, if the computer processing speed at the terminal's input and output is 1000
bits-per-second. too much slack has been required in the variable. Relative to the
previous discussion, this may adversly affect cost with no necessitated gains. In short,
the quantitative or qualitative descriptions required must represent reality.
Another consideration involves a standard, or nearly standard means of attaining
values for measures. The Marine Corps' Technical Interface Concepts (Chapter V)
represents an attempt at regulating this process. By describing the statics involved, the
process between elements, and comparing these with existing integrated systems, the
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process becomes regulated. Anomalies require justification for addition to existing
databases. Similarities aid in starting the process of detailed requirements listings. If.
for example, a similar task (process) is required of other elements (statics) within the
database, decomposition may well lead to physical properties already used to support
such a function. These values lend a starting point for requirements. More important,
the point is already employed by the organization, in this case The Marine Corps, and
adherence to such a level, while perhaps not imperative in this specific application, may
well serve to assist future endeavors. Suppose the message standard leads to a
bandwidth specification of 5 Mhz impacting speed, reliability, security, and economy
(for this example). While not a critical or required measure in this case, the designated
parameter affects (positively) interoperability thereby allowing for possible expansion
of the desired system into other applications.
Relative importance of measures at the acquisition management level is
dependent ultimately, and optimally, on support of the mission need described in
Module 1. This is determined, in the final analysis, on performance under actual
operating conditions. However, decisions involving performance and effectiveness must
be made much earlier in the process. Lacking 'fool-proof means of weighting
measures, the decision maker must make, at times subjective, judgements as to
associated merit. This may again require an iterative process. Political reality
currently mandates interoperability, reliability, and economy as critical measures. A
'generic' ranking is certainly unwise and description of decision theory is beyond the
scope of this thesis. One means, or consideration, is certainly worth mentioning.
While seemingly self-evident, the decision maker must assure amelioration of both
operator and systems engineers in the process. Failure to consider the input of one or
the other may lead to disastrous consequences.
Two final points need to be stressed. While the measures (MOPs in this case)
may be interrelated, the equations used in defining them are not. The parameter
'range' may be used in determining both 'speed' and 'security'. However, the
formulation of these must be kept separate. Mathematically, while security may be a
function of range (security = f(range....)) and speed is a function of range (speed =
grange....)), the functions are unique even if the design parameters are equal.
Finally, both quantitative and qualitative standards have merit in the analysis.
While numeric values may be desirable, they are not always attainable. Verbal
descriptors may point to debate and subjective judgement; however, a measures' merit
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is not to be based on an ability to assign an arithmetic rate. The measure is necessary
because it aids in characterizing the system. Omitting qualitative measures would
result in an incomplete description.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has defined and described generic measures of performance to be
used in analysis of a communications system. As part of the description, a listing of
parameters was derived to support derivation of each measure. Table 4 reflects the















Component MTBF, Redundancy, Receive
Sensitivity, ReceiveSelectivity, Transmission
Efficiency, Required BER, Mean Time to
Repair
Modulation, Frequency Range, Range,
Signalling, Cryptographic, Interface Connectivity,
Message Format and Design, Interface
Operating Procedures
BPS or Baud Rate Requlred.Throughput,
Switching Rate, Routing Plan, Human
message handling speeds, Dialing method,
Precedence levels, Processorspeed and
capacity, Queuing, GOS Required
Economic (cost) constraint, Crypto
(hardware/software compatibility)
requirement, Required probability of
Intercept/exploitation, Known or projected
enemy capabilities, TEMPEST requlrement(s)
Ability to expand, contract, or reorganize
service, Choices of bit rate, Choice of
transmitter power, Choice of error control,
Mobility factors
Economic (cost) constraint, Redundancy,
Range, Transmit power, Signalling and
modulation,BER, Antenna design,
Propagation factors, Mobility factors
Budgetary (manpower/training) Impact,
Flexibility and mission need statement
Conciliation between the project and existing
demands for scarce resources.
37
IV. TECHNICAL INTERFACE CONCEPTS
INTRODUCTION
Powerful, sophisticated, command and control (C2) svstems that exploit a rapidlv
expanding technological base are becoming realities:' yet. issues concerning their
integration into the larger context of a command and control architecture remain
unresolved. Military planners require clearlv defined standards of compatibility
and interooerabilitv'to retrofit fielded systems, modify those currently in design,
and plan for future ones. A major goal of the Department of Defense is "to
provide these planners with accurate, detailed information about their particular
svstem requirements, about the interrelationship of their tactical system with
o'ther systems, and about the impact that system will have on the architecture as
a whole.
Achievement of this goal requires development of a suitable method for
identifying, capturing, organizing, and accessing information necessary to
describe current and" projected svstems. Succinctly stated, the military must
develop a usable model of its C2 architecture. This model must provide two
essential premises. First, it must answer detailed questions about the C2
structure, providing a view of that structure in its totality as well as its
particulars. Second, it must provide input to programs engaged in dynamic
analysis such as wargame scenarios and network, loading studies [Ref. 10].
This quote provides a concise statement of DoD and Marine Corps' objectives
relative to managing command and control architectures. Most of the references cited
in this chapter have to do specifically with inter and intraoperability, yet in
standardizing interoperability and acquisition management processes and
responsibilities, it also provides a systematic mechanism for compliance with the
bounding, process definition, integration, and data generation modules of the MCES.
This chapter will describe the Technical Interface Concepts (TIC) and Marine Corps
Interoperability Management Plan (IMP) principles applicable in the MCES
framework, pertinent to communications acquisition and management.
B. PURPOSE
The overall objective of the Interoperability Management Plan (IMP) is to
ensure the exchange of critical tactical information. This is accomplished at two levels:
first, on a Marine Corps unique level (referred to as intraoperability) then, on a joint or
combined level between Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and other U.S. or
Allied commands. The IMP centralizes and standardizes procedures for management
activities. These procedures aim to accomplish the following:
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• Identify the manner in which existing and new interoperability requirements and
standards are identified, defined, standardized, and documented.
• Facilitate the implementation,, verification, testing, and certification of those
standards in developing tactical data systems (TDSs) and interconnecting
equipment.
• Prescribe coordination between the various configuration management bodies
and activities that control modifications to requirements, standards, TDSs, and
interconnecting equipment.
• Ensure that interoperability program requirements are adequately planned for
and funded [Ref. if: p. 1-3J! ~
The Technical Interface Concepts (TIC) document identifies and establishes
Marine Corps command, control, and communications (C ) facility and systems
operational interface requirements for both current and future periods. It is a baseline
from which other USMC interoperability technical documents, standards, and
specifications are developed [Ref. 12: p. 1-1]. The objective of the TIC is to provide
the framework to ensure that fielded Marine Corps Tactical Command and Control
Systems (MTACCS) are compatible, interoperable, and operationally effective. In
keeping with the IMP. MTACC systems are first intraoperable, then interoperable with
other than Marine systems. Compatibility with other service systems is to be attained
through application of the JINTACCS (Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command
and Control Systems) program.
C. PHILOSOPHY
The MTACCS concept of standardizing automated interfaces has been to : (1)
standardize at the "transmission format" level, (2) leave the man-machine interface to
be resolved by individual system requirements and constraints, and (3) to bit-code
messages and data items. The JINTACCS concept has evolved to one of
standardizing: (1) both at the machine and human levels, (2) for voice, record, and
automated interfaces, and (3) character codes for data items. In order to maintain
compatibility in JINTACCS Allied operations, MTACCS systems engineering has
maintained compatibility at the data item level and developed message conversion
protocols for specific interfaces [Ref. 12: p. 1-2].
D. METHODOLOGY
This section will address the specific set of procedures designed to determine
specifications and standards from validated operational (or mission) requirements. The
mission requirements formulation is the responsibility of Mission Area Sponsors.
These sponsors conduct Mission Area Analyses (MAAs) in an effort to validate
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current requirements and to define future operational needs. A command and control
architecture is then developed to facilitate the aggregation of associated elements
required to support mission needs. The basic entities of a C architecture are
illustrated in Figure 4.1 (author's concept) and described below [Ref. 11: p. 3-3].
Figure 4.1 Marine Corps C z Architecture.
1. Operational Facilities
Otherwise referred to as OEs (Command and Control Elements) in the
parlance of Joint planners, Operational Facilities (OPFACs) are those elements tasked
with performing the C" Process functions described in Chapter II (Table 4). Each C^E
consists of equipment, communications, facilities, personnel, and procedures required
to assist the commander in carrying out his C responsibilities. They vary widely in
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size and complexity from a single forward observer (FO) to a large, integrated Fire
Support Coordination Center (FSCC).
2. Tasks
OPFAC or C^E tasks are those functions performed by the C^E requiring it
to exchange information with other C"Es. They are extracted from existing documents
reflecting approved doctrine, procedures and techniques contributing to the overall
command and control function.
3. Message Elements/Standards
Elements are the fundamental details of information used to construct
messages. Message elements are composed of standard Data Field Identifiers (DFIs),
Data Use Identifiers (DL'Is) and Data Items (DIs). These standards are used to
implement information exchange in Marine Corps TDSs. The elements are collected
and formed into standard messages and documented in the Technical Interface Design
Plan(TIDP).
4. Equipment and Link Requirements
C~Es relate to one another as either source or sink {sender or receiver) of the
messages described above. This relation implies a requirement to establish a
communications link in support of information flow. The link is established using
TDSs interconnected with communications equipment, each of which can be
characterized by their functions. Communications links are defined in terms of
operational characteristics and constrained by technical factors. Ultimately, the link
requirements are specified in terms necessary to support mission needs. Compliance
with these needs allows specific description of the link and its associated equipment.
5. Protocol Standards
Protocols are the rules or procedures by which information is transferred
through systems, interconnecting equipments, and networks. Marine Tactical System
(MTS) protocols are defined by an eight-layered reference model beginning with the
transmission media and ending with user application. The model and standards are
documented in the TIDP.
6. Message Exchange Occurrences
A command and control architecture is typically represented as a Data- Flow-
Diagram (DFD). The circles representing nodes and the connecting lines
communications links. A specific node in a C network may be comprised of one or
more C^Es. For example, an Infantry Battalion node may be made up of Fire Support
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Coordination Center (FSCC) and Combat Operations Center (COC) C [Is. In keeping
with the previous discussion of architectural elements, the lines must also represent
messages to be transmitted along the link. Without the message requirement the link is
idle. The most basic network, then, consists of two (."'lis, a link, and a message that
transports information along the link. This relation is portrayed in Figure 4.2.
Limiting the description further, to the transmission of a single message, requires a
discrete information transfer. This is termed a Message Exchange Occurrence (MHO).
Validated MEOs establish a requirement for interoperability and at the same time a









Figure 4.2 Message Exchange Occurancc.
E. IMPLEMENTATION
A listing of all validated MEOs is useful in portraying an architecture as it exists
in its "potential" state. In order to model the C" process in a specific "kinetic" state.
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order must be subscribed to the MEOs describing flow of C" activity as a sequence of
events [Ref. 10]. The modelling process is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The model can be
used to define specific measures of effectiveness and then validate the system support
of mission need. Even a superficial understanding of military structure would suggest
to the reader that a listing of MEOs is quite extensive. This section will explain how
MEOs are derived, used to build a network, and used to model command and control.



















Figure 4.3 MEO Chain.
1. Information Base
1 he number of MFOs is seemingly limitless. Many pages would have to be
written to effectively capture the information content of all MFOs. Screening the
potential exchange capabilities and requirements to find matches or similarities for
potential architectures would be a grueling task. An automated database would
expedite this process improving management of both existing and potential C systems.
I he Marine Corps Interoperability Database (IDB) is being designed to
provide improved management, integrity, and communication of inter intraoperability
information. The IDB will provide the automated tools to:
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standardize and centralize inter intraoperability data;
manage proposed changes to interoperability requirements and standards;
automate and manage the documentation process (TIC,TIDP);
automate compliance tracking; and,
coordinate between interoperability requirements and standards.
Additionally, a fully functional IDB will provide a basis for the implementation of
future applications such as:
• simulation of inter, intraoperability scenarios under battlefield conditions; and,
• determine alternative communication interfaces/configurations [Ref. 13: p. 3].
The first step in developing the IDB is to identify and describe the basic
2
components that define the C architecture. Then the relationships that exist between
these components are specified and entered into the base of information.
At the most general level, the C architecture components are:
• C 2Es (OPFACs)
• C E tasks
• OE resources
2
• Information required to perform C E tasks
• Communication capabilities to support the exchange of information [Ref. 10].
Each of these have been previously described. Figure 4.4 shows this set of components
and their relationships. OEs have two kinds of resources: people and equipment. The
degree to which people or equipment are employed depends on the degree of
automation involved.
2. Process
The Data Flow Diagram (DFD) is the primary tool used to illustrate the
major components of the IDB and to systematically decompose major functions to
their basic level. The function being described is the MEO. Its elements include: the
C E, message, and link.
a. Deriving C Es
2C Es are identified by name, location within the organization, and by tasks
they perform. Titles, such as "fire direction center," simultaneously identify the
Element and give some idea of their function. These titles become progressively more
descriptive, identifying branch and echelon (e.g. infantry regiment fire direction center)
and joint or combined level (including service and nation). A OE is specified, then, by





Figure 4.4 Components of C Architecture and Their Relationships.
The OF is the processing component of the system. It performs a transfer
function processing input and changing it to output. This process is illustrated in
Figure 4.5. The Input-Process-Output (IPO) function is presented as both information
and signal processing.
b. Deriving Message Standards
"> ")
A OF is viewed, then, as a O system component whose function is to
~>
process information. One OF may receive raw intelligence information in an
incoming message. This information is processed by extracting pertinent information
in terms of an intelligence assessment. This assessment is then distributed to other
OFs as an update in an outgoing message. The transfer function can be described in
terms of the tasks being performed. An analysis of these tasks suggest the information
required by the processing OE. A decomposition of a C E task results in a set of





(Message X Decision Message Y)
(Signal X Process Signal Y)
Figure 4.5 IPO Model.
packaged in a message feeds the general task, inlormation elements feed the OE
subtasks. these elements can be correlated with standard message elements. The set of
message elements reflects the information requirement necessary for all the subtasks
reflected in the general task. By labeling this set, an appropriate message standard is
specified.
To illustrate the decomposition process, consider a hypothetical situation in
which a tactical air operations center (TAOC) must alert a light anti-air missile
(LAAM) battalion combat operations center (LAAM BN COC) to the possibility of
engagement with enemy aircraft. The TAOC must determine what message will convey
completely the information required by the LAAM BN. A tactical alert will invoke a
set of procedures at the LAAM BN COC. The COC must perform the subtasks listed
in Table 5. These tasks govern the information required from the TAOC. Using the
Marine Corps Message Element Dictionary (MED), standard elements of information
can be derived, called Data Field Identifiers/Data Use Identifiers (DFI/DUl)(Shown in
Table 6).
If this particular combination of standard message elements is in the Marine tactical
system's message inventory, it should be used. If not, the required elements are




SUBTASK NUMBER SUBTASK DESCRIPTION
Subtask 1 assign a track number to the
tactical alert
Subtask 2 classify the alert in terms of its
track type
Subtask 3 record the time of the event
Subtask 4 classify the aircraft In terms
of threat type
Subtask 5 estimate flight size
Subtask 6 record the bearing
Subtask 7 record the range
Subtask 8 record the altitude
Subtask 9 record the velocity


























If the task description is incomplete, the user or cognizant doctrinal agency initiates
action to correct it. This assures that operational requirements drive message
standards.
c. Deriving Link Standards
Information is generally transmitted to a C E through an electronic signal.
The message (Text) is entered into a converting device at the input, changed to
electronic format and passed through a string of equipment to the next C E, Here it is
translated into the original textual form. Input and output requirements for each
electronic device in the string are expressed technically as equipment specifications.
Matching the input text to the output text specifies compatibility for the link. Figure
4.6 characterizes the communications system and illustrates signal interface
requirements. By correlating the specifications of a system with these standards, the
signal interface requirements are satisfied. The technical specifications define the























Figure 4.6 Communications System.
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OE links are usually constrained by the environment and context dictated
in the mission requirement. These operational factors include determinants like range
and security. These restrictions also help refine the technical specifications leading to a
OE link standard. Requirements are successively broken down into lower levels of
detail through engineering analysis. If no system or equipment set exists to support
the link requirement a circuit standard is adopted as a set of design specifications for
the system.
3. Network Construction
The MEO is the basic network building block. A complete set of MEOs
produces the C Network. The proper association of MEOs is crucial to the
construction of a network to be used as the model for command and control. While
the MEO. by definition, describes a direct transfer of information, at times the
exchange may transpire between non-adjoining C Es. To accommodate this
eventuality, the concept of a virtual message exchange occurrence (VMEO) is
introduced. The VMEO denotes a path from the source OE to the sink OE through
one or more intermediate OEs. In essence the VMEO is simply a chained MEO as
shown in Figure 4.3.
Command and control flow diagrams (C FDs), a specific application of data
flow diagrams (DFDs), are constructed using the doctrinal studies described in mission
area analysis. The OFDs represent pictorially the flow of C J activity in the network.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 combined with Tables 7 and 8 summarize the network design
process.
F. SUMMARY
The interoperability database will provide a valuable tool for planners and
managers to standardize description of the Marine Corps command and control
architecture. Consistent application of the MEO concept in the IDB will help ensure
interoperability and, at the same time, should reduce the procurement of redundant C
systems. Driven by mission needs, the Technical Interface Concepts is in keeping with
DoD direction discussed in Chapter II under Problem Formulation. The use of
Message Exchange Occurrences follows closely the system bounding, process definition
and integration modules of the MCES. Finally, the MEO description available in the
IDB allows for data generation (Module 6) and aggregation following the outline of
System Effectiveness Analysis which follows.
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LEGEND:



















Figure 4.7 OFD for Direct Support Artillery Mission (DSAM).
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TABU: 7
MliO SCI FOR DSA.M
MEO SOURCE C2E SINKC2E MESSAGE LINK
1 FO BTRY FDC CALL FOR FIRE VHF RADIO
2 FO BN FSCC CALL FOR FIRE VHF RADIO
3 BTRY FDC HOWITZERS FIRE CMD WIRE
4 BTRY FDC FO MSG TO OBS VHF RADIO
5 HOWITZERS BTRY FDC SHOT WIRE
6 BTRY FDC FO SHOT VHF RADIO
7 FO BTRY FDC ADJUST VHF RADIO
8 BN FSCC BTRY FDC CHECK FIRE VHF RADIO
9 BN FSCC FO CHECK FIRE VHF RADIO
10 HOWITZERS BTRY FDC RNDS COMPLETE WIRE
11 BTRY FDC FO RNDS COMPLETE VHF RADIO
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j
Figure 4.8 Network Derived From MFO Message Set For DSAM.
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TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF NETWORK DESIGN PROCESS
STEP 1
:
Establish the operational requirement.
a. Establish the command and control requirement.
(1) Identify C2Es by:
(a) Name
(b) Tasks
(c) Location within the command and control structure
(2) Draw C2FDs by:
(a) Determining the sequence of activity for the
mision area
(b) Classifying the Information passed from C2E
to C2E in general terms
b. Establish the general communication requirement.
STEP 2: Construct an MEO
a. Produce a message by:
(1) Decomposing the C2E task into elemental C2E tasks
(2) Correlating the elemental C2E task with required
Information elements
(3) Correlating the Information elements with appropriate
data elements
b. Identify connectivity from C2E pairs.
c. Produce a C2E link by:
(1) Deriving the link interface requirements from the
communications requirements
(2) Decomposing the link interface requirements Into
technical specifications
STEP 3: Design the Network.
a. Specify the MEOs that comprise a C2E interface
b. Select equipment to Implement the C2E links
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V. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The MCES, as described in Chapter II, provides a logical and orderly framework
for problem formulation, system bounding and specification of measures. The Marine
Corps' Technical Interface Concepts (Chapter IV) characterizes the system and
functions, and integrates them. Assigning the generic Communications measures
(Chapter III) quantitative or qualitative values completes the first six modules of the
MCES. What remains is to aggregate parameters and/or measures and then compare
them to some desired state. System Effectiveness Analysis (SEA) focuses on the
quantitative aspects of obtaining and evaluating measures. The steps of SEA can
therefore be embedded in MCES, specifically in the last modules (Generation and
aggregation). The following is a brief history of SEA provided the author by Dr.
Alexander H. Levis, Senior Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
B. BACKGROUND
System Effectiveness Analysis was first tested, starting in 1977, with funding from
the Department of Energy (DOE) at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (VI IT).
The three year project focused on large power systems culminating in a final report
(Pierre Dersin) during May 1980. Thesis works conducted primarily on command and
control systems include: Bouthonnier (August 1982), Cothier (August 1984), Karam
(January 1985), Bohner (May 1986), and Martin (August 1986). Other applications of
the methodology include work on Flexible Manufacturing Systems (Washington -
January 1985) and Assessment of Internal Combustion Engines (Levis, Haupt and
Andreadakis - 1985).
C. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
The description of SEA provided herein follows closely the work of Cothier
[Ref. 14: pp. 11-17] and Levis [Ref. 15: pp. 2-11, 15-17].
The basic premise of the methodology is that a C system provides a service to
the commander and his forces and, conversely, the commander establishes performance
requirements for the system. Or, the C J system possesses a range of performance
characteristics and the commander specific requirements based on his assigned mission.
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The analysis assumes an ability to model both system capabilities and commander's
requirements in terms having the same measure. This assumption is critical for without
like dimensions, the evaluation falls apart.
1. Concepts
The integration of MCES and SEA is possible because both approaches are
based on the same concepts. Specifically: system, environment, context, design
parameters, measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness. Of these six only
the term context has not been previously addressed (see Chapter II). The system and
environment are defined within a particular context upon which the system cannot act,
but which affects the system. It describes the circumstances surrounding an event or
situation. Figure 5.1 shows the relation. Figure 2.3 portrays the connection, derived
for this specific application.
ENVIRONMENT
CONTEXT
Figure 5.1 System, Environment, and Context.
2. Methodology
The mission, system, environment, and context have been defined in Modules
1 through 4 of MCES, and the Measures of Performance for a communication system
described in Chapter III. The first step in SEA is to select the design parameters that
influence each system MOP (also characterized in Chapter III). By definition, these
parameters are considered mutually independent, since they constitute the "independent
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variables" in the analytical formulation of the methodology [Ref. 15: p. 6]. The key
word or element in step-one is system.
The second step consists of defining parameters for mission requirements. The
important words being mission and requirement. Levis indicates that this step, while
implied in the feedback loop, is not explicit in MCES [Ref. 15: p. 7].
In steps three and four the chosen system and mission parameters are used to












are the mission parameters and Rm are mission requirements. The issue of
independence, previously addressed, is also applicable for the A's and R's derived from
the formulation. Yet as dependent variables, they may be interrelated through use of
common parameters. Hence, trade-offs in one area may impact others. The results of
these steps are specification of value(s) for both MOP and mission reflected as points
or regions in their respective spaces.
While both spaces may be of the same dimension, they could be defined in
terms of different quantities or quantities scaled differently. Step five consists of
transforming the dimensions into like quantities to be defined on a common coordinate
frame.
The system measures of performance are functions of system parameters. As
the x's in equation (1) van" over their allowable range, so also do the MOPs generating
a locus in the MOP space. The transformation from parameter to system locus is
illustrated in Figure 5.2. Analagously, a set of values that satisfy mission requirements
are mapped to form a mission locus (Figure 5.3).
The seventh step is the key in analyzing effectiveness. In this step the system
MOPs and mission Requirements are quantitatively compared through the geometric
properties of the intersection of the two loci (step 6). These relations may take on





























Figure 5.2 System Locus.
(1) The two loci do not have any points in common, i.e., the intersection of L,
and Lm is null:
L, n Lm = o (eqn 5.3)
In this case, the system does not satisfy the mission's requirements, and one would
define the effectiveness to be zero, regardless of which specific measure is used (Figure
5.4).





















n Lm * o






n Lm < L s and Lm (eqn
s 5'
In this case, a subset of the values that the MOPs may take satisfies the mission
requirements (Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.4 Form One.
Figure 5.5 Form Two.
Many different measures can be used to describe the extent to which the system meets
the requirements. Each of these measures may be considered an MOF. For example,




n Lm).T(Ls ) (eqn 5.6)





n Lm)/T(Lm) (eqn 5.7)
expresses the degree of coverage of the requirements by the system capabilities. Two
special cases of the intersection include:
L
s Sn Lm (eqn 5.8)
In this case, it follows from Equation 5.8 that L
s
is larger than Lm and. consequently,
the ratio defined by Equation 5.6 will be less than unity. 'I his result can be interpreted
in two ways, first, only certain system attribute values meet the requirements of the
mission. The second interpretation is that the use of this system for the given mission
represents an inefficient use of resources since the system capabilities exceed the
mission requirements. Inefficiency, in turn, implies lower effectiveness (figure 5.6).
Alternatively,








The system locus is entirely contained in the mission locus which might imply that the
system completely satisfies the mission requirements. However, there are ranges of










Figure 5.7 Form Two, Case B.
The measures of effectiveness given by Equation 5.6 or Equation 5.7 are
partial measures. Let these partial measures be denoted by {E..}. To combine these
into a single global measure, utility theory may be used. Therefore, the subjective
judgements of the system designers and the users can be incorporated directly into the
methodology in two ways: (1) by choosing different partial measures, and (2) by
selecting a utility function. The global effectiveness measure is obtained, finally, from
E = u(Ej. Et E^). ;eqn 5.10)




A graphic representation of the System Effectiveness Analysis methodology is
shown in Figure 5.8. This presentation implies, as has been stated, that Mission and
system parameters are derived independently. This aspect of SEA and MCES
procedures is in keeping with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
requirement to express requirements in mission terms [Ref. 5]. This represents a goal
to which all acquisition managers should subscribe. Through successive iterations of
each process both parameters are adjusted to construct an efficient; effective structure.
The mission requirements will normally represent a 'first-cut' or goal for the system.
The system attributes describe contractor or other technical capabilities to meet the
mission requirements. Examination of the differences allows for redefining goals or
'forcing' technological progress. Broad disparities may also cause project termination
before additional resources are spent on an imprudent venture.
This presentation of SEA may suggest the necessity to quantify and describe
measures in two or three dimensions. In fact SEA has worked command and control
problems in up to seven spaces. In such cases, two and three dimensional decision aids
are prepared after careful consideration of the processes involved in working each
measure. Limiting or forcing the use of only two or three measures in the evaluation
causes a loss of information and may adversely affect the decision process.
Finally, it seems apparent to this author that of all the modules of MCES the
quantitative aspects of module seven needs additional effort. Detailed mathematical
descriptions, beyond the scope of this thesis, are required to relate, generically, the
communications processes inferred in Chapter III (Measures). System Effectiveness































This chapter serves to demonstrate application of the tools previously described
in the acquisition process. The problem addressed is purposely simple allowing,
especially in the aggregation module, a graphic portrayal of the analysis process.
Analysis of a more complex system would be much more involved requiring a detailed
understanding of engineering, mathematics, and decision theory, beyond the scope of
this thesis.
B. DESCRIPTION
An architectural evaluation of a large command and control system has been
conducted to assess the system effectiveness in light of a recently conducted Mission
Area Analysis (MAA). The outcome of the study indicated that the communications
element of the architecture was vulnerable to current and projected enemy electronic
warfare (EW) platforms. The following sub-sections outline the steps taken to
formulate alternatives for the decision making process using the tools discussed in
Chapters II-V. Database considerations are separately noted at the end of each sub-
section.
1. Problem Formulation
A requirement exists within the C system to transmit data among units. This
process is interrupted when an enemy jammer disturbs the link.
Intelligence sources indicate an enemy jamming presence capable of emitting
both UHF and SHF broadband noise. The UHF emitter uses a 5db gain crossed
dipole antenna and the SHF, a 42db dish antenna. Both transmitters can generate up
to 1000 Watts of output power. The jammer operates from an airborne platform;
however, because of friendly air suppression, can approach ground based sites no
closer than 200 miles. This estimate represents projected capabilities spanning the next
ten years.
Database considerations: None specific to this module.
2. C~ System Bounding
The physical entities of the system are described as Units Alpha and Bravo.
These two command and control elements (C Es) are first verified to be elements in
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the data base and then used to ascertain structure (organization hierarchy and
information flow patterns). While Unit Alpha is found to be hierarchically senior to
Bravo, the information flow patterns indicate two-way, proportional dialogues; hence, a
requirement for full-duplex communication. The bounding process also highlights
digital vice analog transmission at a data rate of 1200 bps for the current terminal
devices and 2400 bps upgrades during the next decade. Units Alpha and Bravo operate
no closer than 200 and no further than S00 miles apart. The physical depiction of the
bounding process is shown in Figure 6.1.
Database considerations: If a OE is not found in the database, then
justification for inclusion is compiled and submitted to the database manager for
action.
Figure 6.1 Bounded System.
3. C Process Definition
The OEs and the most basic link requirements were described in the
'bounding' module. Following the MCES and Marine Corps descriptive processes,
outlined in Chapters II and IV, it is now necessary to derive the message standards (or
C process function) prior to system integration. This section borrows from the
architectural process definition conducted (assumed) prior to this communications
system study. During the previous evaluation, the environmental 'initiator' of the C
~)
process, the internal C^ mechanisms, and the desired outputs were manipulated and
">
appraised over varying scenarios or contexts. C"E tasks and information requirements
are generated and used to specify the message standard(s). Tasks are decomposed into
subtasks. The subtasks specify message elements which are described in the Message
Elements Dictionary' (MED) as Data Field Identifiers; Data Unit Identifiers
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(DFI DUIs). This functional decomposition describes, alphanumerically, the command
and control process of interest.
Database considerations: Specific DFIDLTs are assumed to exist in the
database. If the database is missing these identifiers, justification is provided to have
them included.
4. Integration
The bounded system (OEs and links) coupled with required processes
(messages) forms Message Exchange Occurrences (MEOs). These MEOs are analyzed
and used to depict the overall requirement in the form of a command and control flow
diagram (C FD)( Figure 6.2). The MEO (or set of MEOs) is then compared with
existing standards using the interoperability database. For purposes of this
explanation, the C Es and message standard elements exist as specified in the MEOs.
The link standards, while similar, will vary as a result of friendly and threat
technological change. The database (MEOs) will be used, however, for initial system
evaluation. This process allows analysis of existing systems prior to specification of
new hardware or software requirements, thus verifying that changes are necessary to
meet the mission objectives specified in Module 1.
Database considerations: Assuming, as in this case, that the C Es and
DFI/DLTs exist in the database, and that link standards exist for the system under
consideration, once a new communications system is developed, a means must exist for
differentiating between the former and current MEOs. As long as the older links are in
use, a distinction is necessary for the new parameters.
5. Measures of Performance
While all of the generic measures described in Chapter III may be applicable,
this analysis will focus on speed, survivability, and flexibility.
Database considerations: The database may contain information pertaining to
previous evaluations. This information should include any measures used in
conducting the study.
6. Data Generation
The performance of the communications system must be ascertained using (a)
data generation technique(s) (see database considerations). The system itself must
meet the following requirements:
• speed: 1200 to 4S00 bps
• survivability: 10" 3 to LOT7 BER
• flexibility: ability to operate varying bit rates over the required range
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Figure 6.2 Integration Depiction.
The speed requirement meets both current and anticipated ( 1 200-2400bps) terminal
capabilities. The additional 2400bps allows engineers flexibility in design, yet caps
available speed avoiding spending for unnecessary capacity. The Bit-Error-Rate (BER)
specifications should meet current and planned needs and also set an upper limit on
expenditures. The flexibility measure is subjective. It is included for the decision
maker to choose between identical or nearly identical systems proposals.
Database considerations: This data is based on both subjective judgement and
specifications available for the current system (found in the 1DB).
7. Aggregation of Measures
The final module addresses synthesis of the mission requirements and then
compares existing and proposed systems with these baseline (mission) needs. The
aggregation process will use the descriptive tools of Systems Effectiveness Analysis
(SEA)(Chapter V) to ensure requirements are met.
Database considerations: The final check on whether the system meets




As stated in the thesis introduction, this section assumes knowledge of
communications engineering principles. The following additional assumptions apply to
the system analysis:
1) Operating distances and jammer standoff will remain the same over the project
life-cycle.
2) The jammer will always be able to work within the footprint of the satellite
antenna and outside the range of friendly air-suppression systems.
The system currently in use will help determine a baseline for the analysis. An
AN/TSC-1 is used at Unit Alpha and an AN/GRC-1 at Unit Bravo. Tables 9 and 10
outline their respective specifications. The system uses a geostationary full processing


















(5 Mhz chip rate)
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1200 or 2400 bps
Figure 6.4 highlights the current performance based on the specifications
previously addressed. As evidenced by the performance line, outside the bounds (data













Frequency hop HopBt = 175 Mhz
PSK
Data Rates 75,150,300,600,
1200 or 2400 bps





Antenna: Horn (Gain = 29 db) Crossed dipole (Gain - 4 db)
G/T: Odb -26 db
Channel Carrier 8Gnz Hopped
Receiver Bandwidth 10 Mhz (Spread) Hopped (225-400 Mhz)
Downlink SHF gHF
Antenna: Horn (Gain = 29 db) Helix (Gain = 9 db)
Power: TWTA (40 Watt) Solid State (200 Watt)
Channel Carrier 8.3 Ghz Hopped
Transmit Bandwidth 10 Mhz (Spread) Hopped (225-400 Mhz)
Modulation PSK PSK
standards. It now remains to further refine the mission performance space in order to
assure that request for proposal (RFP) specifications give designers an accurate
description of requirements and channelize their efforts in keeping with budgetary
limits and mission requirements. The mission requirements relate performance as a
function of data rate and bit-error-rates. The budget limits are constructed given cost-
performance data.
Figure 6.5 illustrates a hypothetical cost-performance curve for this
communications system. While any number of curves may be realistic in this
application, lacking actual data, this curve represents the author's opinion that as
performance improves, cost increases at an increasing rate. Inasmuch as future
terminal applications will push the communications system past current technology,
research and development costs will increase. By keeping cost performance in line with
budget constraints, an upper limit in the mission space can be generated. Such a limit,
when applied to Figure 6.4 may look as projected in Figure 6.6. The line indicates that
as performance increases it will cost more for the system. At lower speeds (1200bps)
adding funds will produce more significant gains in bit-error-rate; whereas, at higher
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Figure 6.6 System Performance with Cost Line.
Systems planners and engineers have indicated that current terminal equipment
requires a 10" 5 BLR @ 1200bps and no worse than 10" 3 BLR @4S00bps to sustain
desired thruput in current and future applications. While thruput is used as a measure
in both mission and cost line determinations, the mathematical formulation of inputs
will vary. Hence, the BLR line (mission) will not be parallel to the cost line previously
addressed. Both limits assume a linear relationship that may or may not exist. The
BLR limits line is shown in Figure 6.7. This line indicates the minimum acceptable
performance to meet mission requirements.
A realistic estimate of the mission space based on speed and survivability is
compiled in Figure 6.8 by combining Figures 6.4 through 6.7. This picture gives the
designer a more definitive, measure oriented description of the desired system. It also
focuses the analysis and decision process, in that alternative systems outside the shaded
area 'C are either too expensive (area B) or unacceptable given the threat and
terminal requirements (area 'A'). Figure 6.8 highlights the fact that the original
(bordered square) requirements space (10" J to 10"' BER and 1200 to 4800bps) allowed
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Figure 6.7 System Performance with BliR Limits.
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Figure 6.8 Mission Performance Space.
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D. SUMMARY
This chapter has demonstrated, through analysis of a simple project, use of the
tools previously explained in this thesis. Several comments relative to the analysis are
in order.
The communications system of interest was made purposely simple to
demonstrate flow between the modules of MCES and to highlight the supplementary
tools from which the modules are filled. A detailed explanation of cost-performance
analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, hence the cursory examination in Section C.
Another area intentionally omitted is a detailed examination of the measures
chosen for this application. Again, the measures chosen are used to demonstrate the
methodology, not to define hard-and-fast guidelines for analysis of like systems. As
previously explained, many measures could have been included in the analysis. This
would have required a detailed study of not only the source of data, but also the
mathematical manipulations necessary to present the information in understandable
form. As mentioned in Chapter V, the modelling of parameters to create or support
measures of performance or effectiveness is perhaps the hardest concept in this
collection of tools to deduce or to comprehend.
Finally, the decision process has been omitted. The intent of this work is to
explain and provide an easily understandable framework within which acquisition
projects can be evaluated short of an actual decision. The decision process is multi
faceted, as highlighted in Chapter II. The information provided in Figure 6.8 will be
useful in framing this effort.
The project manager or decision authority has refined the original data generated
in Module 6 to the point where a viable mission space has been created. Alternative
communications systems that fit or more closely fit the space may provide a logical
choice for contract award. As an example, if the receive antenna gain (Gr) were
adjusted to 10 or lldb, new system curves, relative to the mission space, can be created
(Figure 6.9). Such an adjustment may provide additional direction to engineers or
validate the alternative system's claim to requirements satisfaction.
It is not certain from the information provided what percentage of compliance
with the mission requirements is met by any of the alternative systems. The
intersection of the 'system performance line' with the mission space is in actuality a
collection of points, which, mathematically, cannot be assigned a percentage
compliance. This highlights a potential problem with presentation of requirements in
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cither two or three-dimensional space. While the picture gives a more accurate
description of desired ranges, it should not, at least in this application, be used to fully
evaluate the project. The implication here is that if the system line falls in hand "C",
then it meets the stated requirements and must be selected. Since none of the systems
fall completely within the band, presumably no selection can be made. Had the
evaluation been conducted using additional measures, the possibility of answering the
mission requirements may have been enhanced insofar as the pictorial presentation is
concerned. Ultimately, if the constraints, as functions of other parameters, are allowed
to vary, a more dynamic decision process is created. Stated otherwise, by adding more
dimensions (measures), the possibility of compliance with requirements or tradeoffs
within the mission bounds is improved. The project manager must define the
judgement criteria, in percentages or otherwise, as part of the decision process and
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This thesis has described and explained the use of four tools recommended for
project managers when procuring communications systems. The Modular Command
and Control Evaluation Structure (VICES) provides the framework for this approach.
It is used initially at the architectural level to evaluate the command and control
system of interest. Depending on the application, this process may start globally at the
National Command Authority (NCA) level, working successively through the
command hierarchy to a particular C" system. At the C system level,
communications, weapons systems, intelligence sources, displays, and computer devices
are evaluated as to their contribution to the effectiveness of the C system.
Three tools have been discussed as means by which the modules of MCES are
implemented. Generic measures of performance/effectiveness for the communications
system have been described. Marine Corps Technical Interface Concepts have been
used to bound the problem, define the C process required of the bounded structure
and then integrate the system elements and functions. The Marine Corps
interoperability database (IDB) is proposed as a source for data to quantitatively
describe the generic measures specified for the system. The third tool, System
Effectiveness Analysis (SEA), serves to assist in the data generation process and to
analyze and refine (aggregate) the chosen measures bounded by mission needs and
budgetary constraints. All of these means serve as aids in the decision process.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Use of a structured approach in the evaluation and acquisition processes helps
ensure that all dimensions of the problem are considered, common terms, definitions,
and procedures help managers understand the process they are directing and assists
decision makers by presenting facts and alternatives in a common format. The
existance of databases of information pertaining to structure, processes and
specifications will help managers to evaluate existing systems. The manager can also
use this common source of data as a baseline in exploring future applications.
Continued application of these tools, relative to the database, will sustain maintenance
of the information contained therein, helping to assure accurate future assessments.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Work on this thesis has suggested to the author five areas of potential study
relative to the processes described.
First, concerning problem formulation. Mission Area Analysis (MAA) is
presently used to determine the need for system evaluation. An explanation of the
methodology of MAA would enhance the problem formulation module of MCES.
Second, the generic measures presented herein are the author's interpretation o[
significant performance requirements for a communications system. Review of other
documents suggests additional measures are applicable. For example, availability and
maintainability may be specific measures, rather than criteria dependent on reliability.
An effort needs to be made to refine the measure selection process. As has been
suggested in this thesis, the parameters used to discern measures of
performance effectiveness may be the same; however, formulation of the specific
criterion is different allowing measure independence. The interoperability database
suggest one means wherein this issue of independence can be evaluated.
Third, this thesis has suggested use of the interoperability database as a means
whereby baseline systems can be defined for the analysis process. Modeling of the
system with all of its elements (people, processes, and equipment) has been suggested
but not described.
Fourth, it has been submitted that the collection of tools illustrated herein serve
as an aid to decision makers: however, little has been written on the subject of the
decision process. An understanding of the means and psychology of decision making
is critical to presentation of viable alternatives that support mission need.
Finally, a simple example has been used to demonstrate the utility of a collection
of tools in standardizing the acquisition and evaluation processes. Successive
applications with existing and proposed architectures will ultimately validate the












Command and Control Element
Command and Control Flow Diagram
C Command, Control and Communications
C I Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
C SCSC Cost. Schedule Control Systems Criteria
CBR Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
CDR Critical Design Review
CI Configuration Item
COC Combat Operations Center
COMSEC Communications Security
D,V Demonstration, Validation
DFD Data Flow Diagram
DFI Data Field Identifiers
DoD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DSAM Direct Support Artillery Mission
DSARC Defense System Acquisition Review Council
DTC Design to Cost
DUI Data Unit Identifiers
ECCM Electronic Counter Counter Measures
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
EW Electronic Warfare
FCA Functional Configuration Audit
FO Forward Observer
FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center
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The process of acquiring new government systems is complex. While no single
source describes all of the management principles involved in a product's life cycle, the
following excerpt from Reference 16 (pp. 1-1 thru 1-5) provides a good overview of the
chronology and requirements for governmental procurement. The processes remain
essentially the same; however, several structure changes, made since the reference was
published, are worthy of note. The DSARC (Defense System Acquisition Review
Council) has been replaced by a Joint Resources Management Board (JRMB); and, the
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) is now the USD(A), Undersecretary of
Defense(Acquisition), a new post created in 1986.
2. APPROACH
a. Government Acquisition Policies
Over the past several decades, as large systems have evolved and matured, the
problems encountered in the management of these systems have caused the DoD to
develop a systematic engineering management process that directs periodic review and
control of the program throughout its acquisition and operational life. In the early
1970s, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) was established to provide
policies, methods, and criteria for the acquisition of property and services for all
executive agencies. In 1976 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular
A-109 was published. The philosophy behind OMB Circular A-109 is for the
Government to become a more reliable customer by standardizing its acquisition
policies throughout the Government by avoiding major contract delays and
cancellations, and to promote an unbiased concept definition. It requires that the
Government operating agency establish and justify a valid requirement for a capability,
which must be approved by the executive agency head (Secretary of Defense, NASA
Administrator, etc.) before involving industry in the system acquisition process. The
approval of this needed capability also establishes the priority and theoretically the
availabilitv of resources to fulfill the need.
81
Approval of, for example, a DoD Justification for Major System New Start
(JMSXS) or a NASA Mission Need Statement (MNS) initiates the acquisition cycle.
Circular A- 109 requires that this need be recertified by the agency head upon approval
of a selected design concept for test and demonstration, again before committing the
system to production. The acquisition process may be terminated at any of these
decision points. The DoD approach to be followed using A- 109 includes:
• Prototyping and early demonstration to reduce risk
• Program control and ritualized review by the Defense Svstem Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC)
• Placing of emphasis on tradeoffs between cost, performance, schedule, and risk.
In May 1981, then Deputy Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Frank Carlucci
proposed a number of changes which became the DoD Acquisition Improvement
Program and included:
Revising DSARC reviews to decentralize responsibility
Encouraging capital investment to enhance productivity
Seeking earlier IOC for less ambitious goals, update later
Incentivizing reliability and maintainability
Structuring contracts to consider risks shared by Government and contractor
Putting more emphasis on credibility rather than lowest bid
Reducing cost and time to procure small items by raising thresholds for direct
Program Office and cost data reporting
Reducing requirements for socioeconomic program burdens
Making more realistic cost estimates and higher front-end funding
Permitting purchases with multiyear contracts
i
Promoting the use of Pre-Planned Product Improvement (PI).
As a result of his actions and the subsequent review and approval process,
eight decisions have been made that directly affect the DSARC process:
DSARC decision milestones are to be reduced to Requirement Validation
(Milestone I) and Program Go-Ahead (Milestone II).
The criterion for DSARC review is increased to S200 million in Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and SI billion procurement in
FY80 dollars.
The DSARC briefing and data requirements are decreased to increase the
efficiency of DSARC and other program reviews.
The appropriate service Secretary or Chief in included in the DSARC
membership.
The Under Secretarv of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD RE)
remains the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE).
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• Integration of the DSARC and the Planning Programming, and Budgeting
Svstem (PPBS) process is accommodated bv requireihg that fiscally executable
programs be presented for DSARC review.
• The J MSN'S is to be submitted with the service Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) to initiate a new program. The J MSN'S defines the
mission need, identifies boundarv conditions, and provides an initial acquisition
strategy outline.
In March 19S2 DoDD 5000.1, Major Systems Acquisition, was revised to
reflect the following acquisition management principles and objectives:
• Ensure effective design and price competition
• Improve system readiness and sustainability
• Increase the stability in acquisition programs through effective long-range
planning, use of evolutionary alternatives instead of solutions at the frontier of
technology, realistic budgeting and funding of programs for the total life cvcle,
and planning to achieve economical production rates
• Delegate authority to the lowest levels of the service that can provide a
comprehensive review of the program
• Achieve a cost-effective balance between acquisition costs, ownership costs, and
system effectiveness in terms of the missions to be performed.
b. System Life Cycle
The life cycle for a typical major DoD system acquisition is depicted in Figure
A.l, showing both the previous and current practice. The NASA life cycle combines
the elements of the DoD conceptual and validation phases into one phase and
envisions no production phase; operational and deployment phases are comparable.
Regardless of nomenclature the purpose is the same; from establishing the need to
placing the system into operation. System Engineering is an iterative process whereby
individual aspects of the program, such as design, costs, or risks, for example, are
successively reviewed at the designated milestones and the need recertified before
additional resources are authorized by the reviewing authority for the continuation of
the program. Any DoD milestone decision will be made by the SECDEF only after a
formal review or audit of the contractor effort by Government Program Office
personnel. These reviews, which increase in depth of detail as the system life cycle
progresses, form the basis for the presentations that Government program managers
will use to justify further development of the program. It must be emphasized that for
an actual program, the agency head must decide either to continue the present phase.
proceed to the next phase, or cancel the program. The SecDef can also direct a DoD
Program to omit Demonstration Validation and proceed with Full Scale Development.
A similar cycle is required for "less than major systems," but with Service or Major
Command Milestone approval instead of DoD.
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Figure A.l Major DoD System Life Cycle (Ref. DoDD 5000.1).
/. Concept Exploration (CE) Phase
Concept Exploration (CE) is initiated with the approval of the service
POM, which includes the JMSNS by the SECDEF, who signs the Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM). It extends to the program decision that authorizes
accomplishment of either Demonstration/Validation or Full Scale Development phases.
Approval by SECDEF is contingent upon the DoD component having sufficient
reserves to complete concept Exploration. This phase defines and selects system
concepts for further development. Most activity during this phase is an internal
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Government responsibility; however, several parallel short-term contracts are required
by OMB circular A- 109 to promote the most cost-effective solution. The output from
the contractor effort must define performance envelopes, identify risks, present
preliminary alternative design concepts, and determine the production feasibility of the
design, with schedule estimates and a preliminary Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimate.
These will be used by the Government to establish a functional baseline, usually in the
form of a Type A System Specification (Ref. MIL-STD-490). The output should also
contain a proposed Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Demonstration; Validation
phase. The output from these contractor efforts is reviewed by Government program
management for adequacy. A System Requirements Review (SRR) may be
accomplished here or very early in the Demonstration/Validation phase. Following
this. Government and contractor efforts are combined into a System Concept Paper
(SCP) which contains an updated needs statement, a description of alternatives with
performance estimates, an acquisition strategy, a program structure management plan,
and a risk assessment. The SCP is the basis for review and decision to proceed into
further program phases. The SCP is reviewed first by the service component System
Acquisition Review Council (SARC) and. if approved, the DSARC. This review
constitutes Milestone I.
The DSARC reconfirms the need, determines that risks are adequately
considered and that program structure, technical planning, and LCCs have been
established. When the SCP meets all objectives, it is forwarded to the SECDEF with
recommendations to proceed to the Demonstration, Validation or Full Scale
Development phase. Approval by SECDEF is documented in a SECDEF Decision
Memorandum (SDDM) and authorizes the service to prepare and release an RFP. The
RFP contains the functional baseline, management approach, and the Statement of
Work (SOW) that describes the scope of the contractor effort for the approved phase.
2. Demonstration! Validation (D/V) Phase
The Demonstration, Validation (D/V) phase is initiated by the release of an
RFP by the Government. After proposal evaluation and contract award, the System
Engineering (SE) becomes a contractor effort, usually by two or more contractors.
The D V competitive environment may be maintained through Full Scale Development
(FSD). The objective in the Validation phase is to determine whether to proceed with
FSD. The output of this phase should establish firm and realistic performance
specifications (allocated baseline) that meet the operational and support requirements
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of the contract SOW. This allocated baseline, which is also described as a design
requirements baseline, incorporates technological approaches proposed to satisfy
requirements established by the functional baseline. As the System Engineering
process progresses from the functional to the allocated baseline, required configuration
Items (CIs) are identified. The process includes trade studies to ensure that the system
being defined satisfies the functional baseline and the SOW requirements with the best
possible balance of LCC and Design to Cost (DTC) requirements, schedule, and
operational effectiveness. In addition, continual risk, assessment of the elements of the
proposed system will be made to identify areas of uncertainty that must be overcome
in later program phases. Components whose performance is critical to program
success may be prototyped to minimize risk. A System Design Review (SDR) will be
held at the end of this phase (or early in the FSD phase) to provide a preliminary
allocation or requirements to hardware and software CIs, personnel, and facilities.
This system design will normally be supported by a proposal for the FSD phase,
including program management plans. A Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) and
Integrated Program Summary (IPS) are prepared by the Government Program Office
for review by the SARC(s) and DSARC. If all requirements are satisfied, a Ratified
DCP, IPS recommending approval is forwarded to SECDEF. A SECDEF approval
authorizes contract awards for the next phase.
3. Full Scale Development (FSD) Phase
To initiate the FSD phase, the Government negotiates a contract with one
or more contractors. The purpose of the FSD phase is to ensure that detail design is
complete, major problems have been resolved, achievement of performance
requirements has been demonstrated by testing, and the designed system is producible.
The type of contract is dependent on perceived program risks, but usually a
development contract is a cost-plus-incentive type to encourage innovation and
tradeoffs when technical and engineering problems are uncovered in this phase.
Continual risk assessment is characteristic of the FSD phase. A cost-type contract
award will require the contractor to operate a management system that satisfies
Government Cost Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C, SCSC)(Ref. MIL-STD-S81).
The FSD design activity is based on Part I specifications (Type B, Ref. MIL-STD-490)
and System Engineering documentation, with changes directed by the approved DCP.
as the basis for design.
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The Preliminary Design Review (PDR) is held after preliminary design
effort, but before the start of detailed design. It provides authentication of the Part I.
Type B (MIL-STD-490) development specifications. The Critical Design Review
(CDR) is conducted for each CI before release of the design for production. These
reviews may culminate in a system CDR which reviews the completeness of preceding
CDRs and ensures adequacy of interfaces.
The FSD phase provides verification of performance capability before
operational use by testing the system or equipment in its intended environment. The
results of this testing and any proposed changes, refurbishments, and corrected
deficiencies are evaluated in a series of reviews and audits intended to provide
confidence that the system has been developed sufficiently to proceed with production
for operational use.
The Functional Configuration Audit (FCA) is conducted on each CI before
acceptance of the development effort. The CI must represent the configuration
released for production and demonstrate compliance with the Part I development
specifications (Type B. MIL-STD-490). The Physical Configuration Audit (PCA) may
be accomplished in the FSD phase, but is usually done in the beginning of the
Production and Deployment phase on the first deliverable CI that is built on hard
tooling. A Production Readiness Review (PRR) is held at the end of the FSD phase to
verify that the system is ready to proceed into the next phase.
The output of FSD should result in a tested design that meets contract
requirements and documentation necessary to enter the Production and Deployment
phase, including Part II detail specifications (Type C, MIL-STD-490), a proposed RFP
for the Production and Deployment phase, and an update of the plans proposed in the
Validation phase. This data package receives a DCP update, SARC, and DSARC
review. When all aspects of FSD have been accomplished, the DCP is forwarded to
SECDEF for approval of production.
4. Production and Deployment Phase
The primary objective of the Production and Deployment phase is to
produce and deliver an effective, supportable system at an optimum cost. In a
production run where many items are to be delivered, manufacturing is usually
accomplished in two segments. The first segment starts with low rate production of
initial product batches or blocks and gradually increases to peak rate production as
changes resulting from initial operational use, testing, production tooling, and
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manufacturing are incorporated. Typically the first production configuration item from
hard tooling is subjected to a PCA. Once it has been established that a production
article is built in accordance with the Part II detail specifications, the PCA is complete
and an approved production baseline is established for the configuration item audited.
Once the PCAs for all the CIs are completed, a system level PCA is accomplished and
the product baseline for the system is established.
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